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politique), variations de publics et variations d’acteurs sociaux, cette confusion dans
ce qui souvent ne sont que des simulacres de force, dans ce qui jamais n’est symétrie
entre l’écriture, l’action qu’elle suppose et l’opinion qu’elle appelle, ne réussit pas à
convaincre d’une opinion publique dont on voit mal ce qu’elle doit désigner. Le pro-
jet, en ce sens, ne dépasse pas l’objet.
Si on peut regretter ce flou épistémologique, qu’aurait peut-être pu combler une
attention particulière sur les lieux et les circuits d’opinion qu’ont étudiés Fogel, Jou-
haud et Descimon, le lecteur se réjouira, à l’évidence, de cette anatomie érudite des
batailles polémiques et des bouleversements politiques rythmant le règne de Louis
XIII. Faire voir, faire croire présente et démontre le processus grâce auquel l’abso-
lutisme s’est progressivement mis en place, à travers la mainmise continue du pou-
voir royal sur les différents circuits de l’information politique, littéraire et religieuse
que réaliseront plus avant, sous d’autres formes, la censure et la propagande de
Louis XIV.
Pascal Bastien
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The word “culture”, Allan English tells us, has some 150 meanings; if that interests
you, you will find most of those meanings explicated early in this book, no doubt sat-
isfying its sponsors, the Canadian Defence Academy and one of its elements, the
Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. Despite many tribulations, the Canadian
Forces have decided to add serious education to their culture: degrees have become
a requirement for an officer’s commission, and post-graduate degrees will henceforth
be an asset rather than a question mark for those squeezing their way up the greasy
pole to a general officer’s status.
For more general readers, the particular interest of Understanding Military Culture
will derive from English’s core question: is Canadian military culture becoming
Americanized? It would be no surprise to find that this was the case. Canada’s secu-
rity has long depended on a dominant power — France until 1759, Great Britain until
1940, and the United States ever since. In 1908 Canada and other Dominions formal-
ized a state of affairs that had existed de facto for many years: henceforth Canada’s
military organization, training, and tactical doctrine would be British. In two world
wars, Canada’s armed forces struggled to be interoperable with those of Britain. Uni-
forms, customs, mess etiquette, and even the accents of ambitious officers faithfully
followed British examples.
In 1948 a similar agreement to imitate the United States was approved by the gov-
ernment of W. L. Mackenzie King. Less perfectly and with many a backward glance,
Canada’s defenders accepted the Americans as their models and mentors. The change
was embraced more eagerly by the Canadian navy and air force than by the older,
more culturally self-confident army. For one thing, as equipment-based forces, the air
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force and navy had suffered inappropriate and sometimes inferior British aircraft,
ships, and weapons during the Second World War and envied their American allies.
The army remembered the mass-produced but fire-prone Sherman tank. Some sus-
pected that U.S. generals had been more profligate of their men’s lives than their Brit-
ish counterparts.
Today, 56 years and many joint operations since the 1948 decision, plus the inte-
gration in North American air defence and countless postings to American naval and
military professional schools, formations, and units, would it be surprising that the
Canadian Forces have become the most American of our institutions? If Canadian
admirals and generals were once almost indistinguishable from their British coun-
terparts, Canadian uniforms were deliberately redesigned in 1968 to be green ver-
sions of the United States Air Force service uniform, with rank badges from the
United States Navy and little gold maple leafs where U.S. generals wore silver stars.
After a quarter-century in the Canadian Forces, English would properly insist that
these are purely superficial symbols. His experience, and an increasingly rich tradi-
tion of military sociology on both sides of the border, drives him deeper into the
adjoining cultures and enriches his readers accordingly. Ironically, many of the qual-
ities and most of the defects in U.S. military culture reported by English have socio-
logical dimensions. A common feature in any military organization is promotion.
How can officers best be selected for advancement? How will the ambitious manip-
ulate the measurements? Are the best officers those who take initiatives or those
who always “get it right”? Does a “zero defects” policy inhibit risk-taking? Officers
who insist that they and their units are “ready, aye, ready” for any challenge may
sacrifice others to win approval from superiors. Studies show that lower ranks in the
U.S. forces have lost confidence in the integrity of superiors. “Risk aversion” also
discourages juniors from communicating defects to their superiors.
These were common charges in the era of the Vietnam war, and they are back
again. In post-Cold-War cutbacks, based on arbitrary assessment, the lowest third of
U.S. officers were terminated. The rest absorbed a harsh lesson in the importance of
pleasing superiors. Officers who were less than positive about the long-term pros-
pects in Iraq or who suggested that it would take longer and more troops than Secre-
tary Rumsfeld or President Bush wanted to believe have been sidelined or retired.
Not surprisingly, risk-aversion and a potentially demoralizing careerism have also
been alleged in the contemporary Canadian Forces. Of course, unless they revert to
measuring seniority as sole criterion for advancement, peacetime armed forces
always have difficulty predicting who will succeed on active service.
Unlike the American forces, with four powerful and distinct service cultures,
Canada’s three armed services were officially unified in 1968. If old rivalries sur-
vived and were even confirmed by distinct uniforms during the Mulroney era,
English argues, unification makes it easier for Canada to anticipate the “jointness”
which has been one of the watchwords of the Rumsfeld era. The American services,
in contrast, fight for their own interests. Anyone who visits one of the service acade-
mies soon discovers that rival academies are the enemy. Of course, an observer of
the rivalries between Canada’s services, branches, and even regiments might ques-
tion English’s optimism about jointness.
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Still, there are real differences between the Canadian and American service cul-
tures. Despite conscription crises, Canada has depended on volunteers to fight wars
and fill present-day forces; American wars until the 1990s were fought by masses of
draftees. In consequence, suggests English, Canada tolerates no loss of rights on the
part of service members; the United States allows considerable constraints. In Can-
ada, service is increasingly a job; in the U.S. it is linked to an anachronistic and even
politicized patriotism.
Americans, English suggests, might even have something to learn from Canadian
experience. After focussing exclusively on full-scale combat, U.S. doctrine must
now adjust to peace support missions and “Operations other than war” that Canadi-
ans have practised for 40 years. Like Canadians, American military personnel grow
older, are more likely to be married, and tent to place priority on family responsibil-
ities. Like NDHQ, the Pentagon now deals with civilian leaders without military
experience. Smaller, unified, and ahead of the curve in experience, “the armed
forces of Canada”, English concludes, “may be in a better position than the Ameri-
can services to weather the storms of the future and at the same time, provide a
model for its larger allies to emulate” (p. 151).
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By the 1890s, Christopher Forth tells us, France was suffering from a crisis of man-
hood. Increasingly working in sedentary occupations, challenged by newly assertive
females and increasingly visible homosexuals, French men feared that they — and
society at large — were losing their virility. This is consistent with what a number of
scholars have recently claimed (most notably, Venita Datta, Birth of a National Icon,
2002, and Robert Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France,
1993). By and large they have seen the crisis in terms of a general reaction — mostly
by the political right — to the forces of modernity. It comes as no surprise that anti-
Dreyfusards should ridicule effete intellectuals and Jews, contrasting their physical
feebleness with the robust virility of the army. But Forth argues that the preoccupation
with manhood was equally intense among the partisans of progress — the Drey-
fusards. They couched their defence of Dreyfus in classically masculine terms, stress-
ing their courage and their virile search for the truth, and pointed to the essentially
female characteristics of the gullible anti-Dreyfusard mobs and a typically feminine
resistance to the truth on the part of Dreyfus’s antagonists. Forth makes his case
through a detailed and subtle examination of the discourse of both sides in the affair
with particular attention to the graphic representations in the popular press.
What does all of this tell us about the Dreyfus Affair? Forth is never entirely clear
about the exact connection between the crisis of masculinity and the Affair itself. He
acknowledges that the crisis of masculinity can hardly explain the Affair since,
